Abstract-This paper introduces a new multi-instance key regeneration system used to regenerate cryptographic keys from biometric data. The serial concatenation of Reed-Solomon and Hadamard codes is used with a single mechanism that improves the biometric performance and security of the system, also making possible the regeneration of longer and higher entropy cryptographic keys. The system was evaluated on two public databases: CBS and NIST-ICE 2005. On NIST-ICE 2005 it is possible to regenerate a 287 binary digit cryptographic key with estimated entropy of 160 bits at 0% False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and 0.3371% False Rejection Rate (FRR).
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometrics verification techniques have been used for many decades providing authentication/identification of an individual based on his unique characteristics, e.g., fingerprint, iris, voice, hand geometry, etc. [1] . In particular, the use of biometrics has grown significantly these last decades raising important concerns about the individual privacy and data confidentiality, since conventional biometric solutions require direct storing of user personal data [1] . On the other hand, secret-key cryptography is able to assure high data privacy as long as the cryptographic key is secret, long and as random as possible to provide the required security level (e.g., the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was designed to support encryption keys of length 128, 192 or 256 bits [2] ). However, classical cryptographic keys can not assure that the person using it is actually the genuine user (non-repudiation). The complementary nature of these two important and widely used security tools, namely cryptography and biometrics, stimulated many researchers to investigate new techniques capable of combining them in order to provide privacy to biometric data and obtain cryptographic keys truly linked to the user. The main drawback of this combination is the inherent variability in biometric data because so far cryptographic systems require exactitude to work properly. One of the approaches used to obtain cryptographic keys from biometrics, known as key regeneration, deals with this drawback using error-correcting coding (ECC) techniques.
There are in the literature many unibiometric systems that combine biometrics and cryptography (e.g. [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] ) but most of them face problems regarding low entropy keys and high rejection rate. On the other hand, multibiometric systems [1] can consolidate multiple sources of biometric information and are used to address some of the limitations of unibiometric systems, being able to improve matching accuracy, increase the population coverage and deter spoof attacks. Therefore, using multibiometrics seems to be a promising option to enhance systems that combine biometrics and cryptography. In addition, as shown in [7] , the irises of a person are not correlated and so can be seen as two independent binary information sources, i.e., as a multi-instance 1 crypto-biometric system.
In this paper we propose a multi-instance key regeneration (KR) system which makes use of serially concatenated Reed Solomon (RS) and Hadamard codes that are shown to suit very well the mixed error structure, containing both random and burst errors, presented by the iris. The proposed KR system combines the iris codes obtained from images of both eyes, forming a multi-biometric feature binary vector, and makes use of a simple mechanism able to provide better biometric performance and offer a higher level of security. Our proposed system also makes it possible the regeneration of longer and higher entropy cryptographic keys, in comparison to the ones obtained by other systems [8] , [9] .
Experiments were performed on CBS (Casia-Biosecure) [10] and NIST-ICE 2005 [11] databases. 287 binary digit keys with 160 bit estimated entropy were regenerated on the ICE-NIST2005 database, at 0% false acceptance rate (FAR) and 0.3371% false rejection rate (FRR) 2 . The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows. Section II provides the necessary background for understanding this paper. We introduce our KR system in Section III. In Section IV we describe the experiments performed and present the results obtained. In Section V we present a security analysis of the proposed KR system. Summing up, in Section VI we present some conclusions as well as suggestions for future research.
II. BACKGROUND
Basically three approaches are used to combine cryptography and biometrics, namely Cancelable Biometrics, Key Generation and Key Regeneration (KR). The KR approach has been considered the most effective way to combine biometrics and cryptography in order to obtain cryptographic keys 1 A multibiometric system that captures a sample of multiple instances (e.g. right and left iris) with the same sensor.
2 FAR and FRR are parameters used to measure the performance of biometric systems, where FAR is the measure of the likelihood that genuine users will be rejected by the system and FRR is the measure that false users will be accepted by the system. strongly linked to the user (non-repudiation), allowing key revocability, key diversity 3 and also privacy to the biometric data. ECC techniques are used in order to deal with biometrics inherent variability. Two constructions are popular in this approach: the Fuzzy commitment scheme [12] and the Fuzzy vault scheme [13] . In 1999 Juels and Wattenberg [12] proposed the use of ECC to deal with this variability in order to regenerate cryptographic keys. However, no practical ECC technique was proposed. Only in 2006 Hao et al. [3] proposed a practical KR system based on iris using as ECC technique serially concatenated Reed-Solomon (RS) and Hadamard codes. As explained in [3] , the Hadamard code is used to deal with background errors (random errors) caused for example by camera noise, iris distortion, image-capture effects that cannot be effectively corrected by the pre-processing phase while the RS code deals with burst errors caused for example by eyelashes, eyelids and reflections. This system is able to regenerate 140 binary digit keys with estimated entropy of 44 bits at 0.47% FRR and 0% FAR over a 700-image proprietary database. However over a public database, NIST-ICE 2005 [11] , showed very high FRR, e.g., 19.41% for a 42 bit key.
Other unibiometric KR systems based on Hao et al. [3] scheme were proposed. Kanade et al. [4] inserted two new mechanisms maintaining the ECC technique. As a result, 198 binary digit cryptographic keys with estimated entropy of 83 bits, at 0.055% FAR and 1.04% FRR on NIST-ICE 2005 database [11] are regenerated. In 2009, another scheme also based on the same ECC technique was introduced in [5] providing 94 bit entropy cryptographic keys with variable key length. Bringer et al. [6] proposed a KR system, also based on the iris, that uses a Reed-Muller code in a product code, obtaining 42 bit keys at 10 −5 FAR and 5.62% FRR. Cryptographic keys obtained by the KR approach are subject to some constraints because of the required performance of the biometric system, e.g., low error rate for the ECC technique, low FAR for high security applications and low FRR for commercial applications. Every biometric recognition system has a built-in acceptance threshold, which when raised both decreases FAR and increases FRR. The choice of this threshold is usually done based on the specific application.
The use of ECC in KR systems is very peculiar. In order to choose the appropriate ECC technique the behaviour of biometrics variability of certain biometric characteristic must be observed, e.g., the iris data presents mixed random and burst errors. Moreover, the error-correcting capability of the code must be enough to correct intra-user variations, e.g., differences between error bits for the same eye, but unable to correct inter-user variations, e.g., differences between different eyes.
In this paper we have considered the use of multibiometrics, more specifically the use of two eyes of the same individual (multi-instance). As stated in [1] a multibiometric system relies on the evidence presented by multiple sources of biometric information in order to enhance classification performance. Multibiometric systems are classified as multi-instance, multi-sensor, multi-algorithm, multi-sample, multi-modal and hybrid systems. The biometric information can be combined at different levels, depending on the level of information fusion: sensor-level, feature-level, score-level, rank-level, or decisionlevel fusion [1, Chapter 14] .
So far, there is not much work published regarding the use of multibiometrics in crypto-biometric systems. In 2008 Nandakumar and Jain [8] proposed a multibiometric system that combines fingerprint with iris based on a fuzzy vault scheme proposed originally by Juels and Sudan [13] to regenerate cryptographic keys. Recently, Kanade et al. [9] proposed a multi-instance KR system based on iris, using a weighted error correction technique plus the mechanisms of iris code shuffling and zero insertion, introduced earlier in [4] .
In the next section, we introduce a new multi-instance KR system able to regenerate longer and higher entropy cryptographic keys.
III. NEW PROPOSAL
As observed in [3] , applying serially concatenated RS and Hadamard codes suits well the characteristics presented by the iris. However under less controlled circumstances, where variations present in more realistic databases is an issue, other mechanisms are necessary in order to adapt errors to the errorcorrecting capability of the ECC scheme. This scenario was considered, for example, in [4] and [5] , where in addition to the ECC technique two mechanisms were used: the Iris Code Shuffling, to improve the biometric performance of the system as well as provide revocability to the system, and the Zero insertion to adjust the number of errors to match the errorcorrecting capability of the concatenated code to a desirable level. The proposed KR system also uses a serial concatenation of an RS code and a Hadamard code. An important difference between the scheme presented here and previous ones, that use a similar ECC technique, is the use of a single mechanism to provide revocability to the system, to adapt the errors in a way that the ECC technique can deal with them and to improve even more the biometric performance, achieving not only 0% FAR but also reducing to very low levels the FRR.
A. Description of the New Proposal
The KR system introduced is illustrated in Fig. 1 . During the enrolment phase (key generation) a random cryptographic key K is generated and encoded by the serial concatenation of RS and Hadamard codes resulting in the vector θ ps , denominated pseudo-iris code. The hash value of K, h(K), is stored in a smart card while K is discarded. Fig. 1 . Multi-instance key regeneration system using smart card, iris and password.
The user presents both eyes to the system and the reference iris codes of his right and left eyes, θ ref1 and θ ref2 , are extracted 4 . The iris codes θ ref1 and θ ref2 are concatenated forming the vector θ ref = (θ ref1 |θ ref2 ). For each user a different sequence of binary digits, represented by the vector Rand num, is randomly generated and kept secret, encrypted in a smart card. The modified reference iris code, θ 
it means that K=K ′ with high probability, as a consequence the cryptographic key is considered valid and can be used successfully by the cryptosystem. Notice that the user identity is also verified assuring non-repudiation of the key.
The serially concatenated code used in the proposed system is formed by a t s -error-correcting (n s , k s ) RS code with symbols from GF (2 m ) and a t HC -error-correcting (2 k , k + 1) Hadamard code, denoted respectively, by RS(n s , k s , t s ) and HC(2 k , k + 1, t HC ) where n s is the number of m bit blocks after encoding and k s is the number of m bit blocks before encoding, k is the order of the Hadamard matrix that is obtained by the Sylvester method. Observe that in order to make the two codes work properly in serially concatenated form, it is required to set m = k + 1. RS codes are MDS (Maximum Distance Separable) [14, pp.238 ], i.e., d RS = 2t s + 1 = n s − k s + 1 and thus, n s − k s = 2t s . More details about these codes can be obtained in [14] , [15] .
For each user a different sequence of binary digits, Rand num, is randomly generated. These binary digits are inserted as uniformly as possible and in exactly the same way during enrolment phase and verification phase into the iris code. The insertion of Rand num provides to the system: (a) Improvement of Biometric Performance: Because Rand num is user specific, when a genuine user uses his Rand num at pre-defined positions no errors are introduced; however, if an impostor uses his Rand num, 4 OSIRIS (Open Source Iris System) developed under the Biosecure project [16, pp. 34-40 ] is used to extract a 1,188 bit iris code per iris. the modified iris code has different bits at the pre-defined positions, and errors are introduced. In this manner the separation between genuine and impostor Hamming distance distribution is increased, thus improving the biometric performance of the system (Fig. 2) . (b) System Revocability: Only the binary sequence built from the combination of the iris code and Rand num, i.e., the modified iris code, is able to release the cryptographic key. In case of template compromise it can be revoked by changing Rand num, K and the smart card password. (c) Adjusting the number of errors: The Hadamard code corrects up to 2 k−2 − 1 errors in 2 k bits which means that its error-correcting capability is limited to 25%. Experiments showed that this error-correcting capability is not enough to deal with variabilities present in the iris [17] . Genuine users introduce the same randomly generated binary digits at the same locations during enrolment and verification phases so at these locations the random bits contribute with no errors. This insertion is able to adjust the number of errors to match the error-correcting capability of the ECC to the desirable level. By random bits insertion at genuine user iris codes the total number of errors remains the same, but the number of errors per block decreases. Fig. 2 . Hamming distance distribution for genuine users and impostors for Biosecure database for a multi-instance system and inserting 1,528 randomly generated bits among the iris code bits.
The cryptographic key length ∥K∥ = m · k s is a function of the parameters of the code and the length of the modified iris code and is expressed as
The output of the serially concatenated code, θ ps , has its length limited by the length of the modified iris code and must be equal to ∥θ (Fig.  1) . Therefore, by the use of multi-instance biometrics and Rand num insertion we increase the length of the modified iris code, ∥θ 
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
For the computer simulations different values of code parameters (n s , m) were chosen taking into account factors as cryptographic key length and estimated error-correction capability. These parameters were kept fixed while the system was tested for different values of t s . As illustrated in Table I lower values of t s result in longer keys but with higher FRR and vice-versa. Thus, t s acts as a second level threshold, the adjustment of which allows to fine tune system performance.
CBS and NIST-ICE 2005 databases were used to evaluate the system. The system was initially tested on CBS database [10] in order to tune the system parameters (ECC parameters and length of Rand num) and then the selected parameters were used to evaluate the system under ICE-NIST 2005 database [11] . Since iris rotations during image acquisition are possible, we move the normalized iris image horizontally in both directions to eliminate the rotation effects [16] .
CBS-Biosecure V1 and CBS-Casia V2 databases contain 20 images from each eye from 30 persons, i.e., 1200 images. A total of 27,000 genuine comparisons and 27,000 impostor comparisons were performed, considering the mechanism used to eliminate the rotation effects on each database. The NIST-ICE 2005 database consists of 2,953 images from 244 different eyes consisting of 1,425 images of right irises from 124 users and 1,528 images of left irises from 120 users. The right irises are coupled with the left irises for the multi-instance experiments that consisted of 56,061 genuine comparisons and 3,699,108 impostor comparisons also considering the procedure used to avoid rotation effects.
In the sequel we present the best results obtained so far by considering: (1) FAR as close to zero as possible, since we are considering a security application, (2) low FRR, to avoid user annoyance, (3) cryptographic key lengths and (4) entropy equal to or higher than the ones required by actual cryptosystems. More details about the entropy are given in Section V. Table I shows results in terms of FAR, FRR and cryptographic key length, ∥K∥, obtained by an experiment performed on CBS and NIST-ICE 2005 databases, respectively. In these experiments the parameters for the ECC are n s = 61, m = 7, varying t s . ∥Rand num∥ = 1, 528, 2 binary digits of Rand num are inserted after every 3 bits at the first 2,208 bits of θ ref and 1 binary digit of Rand num is inserted after every 3 bits at the next 168 bits of θ ref resulting in a 3,904-bit modified iris code. The Hamming distance distribution for genuine users and impostors for NIST-ICE 2005 database shows that for these parameters the modified iris code has z = 1, 595 degrees-of-freedom [7, p.283] and that it is possible to obtain 287-bit keys at 0% FAR and 0.3371% FRR, i.e., only 21 (0.3371×6, 229 ≃ 21) among 6,229 authentic samples were falsely rejected. These 21 false rejections occurred because of bit-error rates above 31.93%. The estimated entropy is 160 bits (Eq.3).
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our proposed multi-instance KR system employs of all three factors used for authentication: (a) what the user knows (e.g. password), (b) what the user possesses (e.g. smart card) and (c) what the user is (e.g. biometrics), in order to provide a higher level of security [18] . Since our KR system is used to regenerate cryptographic keys it is important to analyse its security in terms of key entropy. The estimation of the entropy, H, is done using the same criterion used by Hao et al. [3] based on the sphere-packing bound [15] .
Considering that an attacker can obtain the smart card, the system security will rely on the iris and the user Rand num. Supposing that the enemy was able to guess the correct Rand num, the enemy must also provide the correct irises codes extract from both eyes of the user. In order to set a lower bound on the number M of trials, necessary for the enemy to find the right irises codes, we consider a worst case by assuming that the enemy knows all the correlations within the user's irises. It has been proved that these correlations exist but it is not clear yet how they can be exploited [7] . Therefore, by considering the sphere packing bound [15, p.19] 
where z = 1, 595 is the uncertainty provided by the iris code modified and w = t n × z. Since the estimated error correction rate of the system is 31.93%, w = 0.3193 × 1, 595 ≃ 509. By Eq. (2) M ≃ 2 160 which means that the enemy must try to find a 1,595 bit string within 160 bits Hamming distance from the key. In other words, the entropy provided by the system is log 2 M = 160 bits, i.e, H ≃ log 2 M.
Table II compares actual unibiometric(*) and multibiometric cryptographic key regeneration algorithms with the proposed algorithm. It can be observed that our proposal (in bold) achieves better results, e.g., it is possible to regenerate 287 binary digit cryptographic keys with estimated entropy of 160 bits at 0 % FAR and 0.3371 % FRR.
It is also important to observe that the proposed system is less vulnerable to information leakage than the system introduced in [4] , which uses a zero insertion mechanism. In the positions where zeroes are inserted θ lock = θ ps which can leak useful information for the enemy while inserting a randomly generated binary sequence into θ ref causes in some parts θ lock equal to θ ps ⊕ Rand num. Consequently, the only way for an enemy to obtain some potentially useful information about θ ps is by finding the values of Rand num. In order to improve the smart card content security the maximum number of login attempts before lockout can be limited. We suggest the possibility of using another biometric feature of the same individual to unlock the smart card instead of a password.
VI. CONCLUSIONS This paper introduces a new multi-instance KR system to regenerate cryptographic keys from biometric data, specifically from the iris. Our proposed KR system uses as ECC technique serially concatenated RS and Hadamard codes together with a mechanism that inserts a randomly generated binary digit sequence, that is unique for each user. As a result, for example, cryptographic keys were regenerated with length 287 binary digits and an estimated entropy of 160 bits at 0% FAR and 0.3371% FRR on the NIST-ICE 2005 database. Table II shows that our proposed multi-biometric system is able to regenerate cryptographic keys longer and stronger than the ones obtained by previous multi-biometric [8] , [9] as well as unibiometric [4] , [5] , [6] KR proposals. It is worth noticing that the key length and entropy obtained can be used by real cryptosystems. The FAR is zero, which is important for security applications as the one considered here, and FRR was reduced to very low levels making user acceptance of the system higher, since low FRR avoids user annoyance.
The results obtained so far showed good improvements, nevertheless we are still considering other possible scenarios. For example, by taking into account other codes, i.e., other values for m and n s and also other ECC techniques. It is also our goal to investigate ways of not reducing so much the uncertainty, and consequently keeping the entropy as high as possible while keeping a good performance in terms of FAR and FRR.
We believe that is also important to go deeper in the security analysis and show formally why inserting randomly generated binary digits is more secure than inserting just zeroes. In principle our proposed system can be used by other biometric modalities as long as the feature vector is in binary form. Therefore it would be interesting to investigate the use of this system, for example, when using iris and face features.
